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THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE TRUTH
BY J. C. MCKERROW
MIND is an appearance—an unreal appearance—suggested by
the modes of activity of living things. For the plain man,
consciousness is an inevitable and vmrecognized assumption. He
finds himself conscious as naturally as he finds the world external.
It is only necessary, however, to consider living-activity with
sufficient philosophical innocence to see that consciousness is an
assumption. And once that position is attained it is not difficult to
account for the facts of life on other and less debatable grounds.
The value of an assumption is to lay the problems that haunt us, but
the assumption of consciousness raises rich crops of them. My
account of life may be found in the appearance of mind; here I need
only say that it dispenses altogether with the notion of conscious-
ness, regarding plants and animals as manifestations of activity
occurring p.ccording to laws which can be formulated in non-subjec-
tive terms. Whether or not it is an advance, scientifically, to regard
men and monkeys as mjiuifestations of activity occurring according
to law rather than as conscious subjects acting according to the
imaginations of their own hearts, depends on whether the new
account is more explanatory than the old, whether it solves more
problems than the old, while not raising worse new ones. Emphati-
cally it does not depend on whether we like it or not. We did not
like being ousted from the central position in the universe ; we are
not likely to welcome the proposition that, as persons, we do not
exist at all.
If the notion of the conscious subject is a mistaken one, philo-
sophically, it follows that knowledge, as an attribute of the subject,
is also illusion, philosophically. Now this is not new in philosophy.
The arguments of philosophers of all kinds continually lead them
towards scepticism. But they simply say, "But this leads to scepti-
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cism" (lately they say "to pragmatism"; behaviorism has not yet
attained the dignity of being mentioned to be rejected) and forth-
with try another Hne. That is to say, the possibiHty of knowledge,
real knowledge, is held by philosophers to be beyond question—
a
sad lack of philosophical innocence
—
presumably because to do
otherwise they would deny themselves. But it is surely not an un-
familiar parndox if T suggest that, for a philosopher, to lose his soul,
his subjectivity, is the only way to find it. Doubtless it is especially
hard for a philosopher to give up his knowledge ; he has great
possessions.
Speculation by no mean involves a speculator, activity an actor.
The increasing insight of science into the activities of nature has
banished the whole cast of dramatis personae who played before
our primitive ancestors. But the play goes on. And I may banish
myself and still continue to speculate on the nature of things, with-
out absurdity.
It has been said that Kant's pure reason is scepticism and his
practical reason the contradiction of it. So far as his pure reason led
him towards scepticism, so far he was right ; but there he went
wrong. Having arrived at scepticism, he took it for granted that
the pure reason was not in all cases applicable and thereupon
asserted the authority of the practical reason. This was simply the
plain man's prejudice asserting itself ; in the language of Paul, one
might say, it was the old Adam intruding.
Having reached an objective scepticism, Kant should have gone
on to a subjective scepticism. Having proved the impossibility of
knowing anything, he should have wondered whether it was not
because there is no one to know it. But indeed his pure reason had
never been ven,' pure at all. It had not consisted in the banishment
of subjectivity, but in a refinement of that subjectivity, in an attempt
to rationalize it while preserving it. One can be a philosopher and
a plain man but not at the same time. The philosopher must give
up all the plain man's prejudices, not only his prejudice that a spade
is a spade, but also his prejudice that a person is a person. It is
because Kant's dualism of the two kinds of reason is not complete
that it is ineffective ; one simply sceptical and the other simply and
irrationally contradicting it.
May I remind the reader at this point of the manner of mv
approach to the theory of knowledge. T have formed a scientific
hypothesis as to the nature of life, a hypothesis according to which
the knowing subject has no other existence than as a "scientific
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object," and a mistaken one. It thus becomes incumbent on me to
examine the status of what we call knowledge. But the reader must
remember that I am not arguing philosophically against the possi-
bility of knowledge. The hypothesis I assume simply takes its im-
possibility for granted. The fact that philosophers have been led
to scepticism by their reasoning is so much, if negative, support for
my hypothesis.
When I am said ^c see something, what is the nature of the
event thus described, according to my theory? It is the occurrence
in me of a tendency on the occasion of a change in the situation, an
occurrence as necessary as when a chemical reaction responds to a
change in its conditions. Out of this fact arise our notions of a "per-
son," a "thing" and a relation of the former to the latter of "percep-
tion." The thing, as seen, is not a real at all; all that its reality con-
sists in is in being the "object of perception," i. e., the occasion of a
tendency.
Now let the event be "my judging that something presented is
an orange." In this case the event is the occurrence of a particu-
lar kind of tendency in me in respect of a change in the situation,
the tendency, namely, in this case, to judge "It's an orange," a
tendency as little subjective as the other. Out of this fact arise
our notions of the thinking subject, its objects (ideas) and a rela-
tion between them variously named. The reality of the concept
"orange" consists in its being the "object of the understanding" and
that is all its reality. In particular its reality does not consist in its
being representative of a "real" sense-object. That is its value.
Thus my knowledge, whether "by acquaintance" or "by descrip-
tion," is knowledge by courtesy only.
The illusoriness of knowledge in both kinds has long been rec-
ognized. We need not delay over the case of knowledge by
acquaintance. It is clearly relative to the unique character of the
knower, his particular morphological character, his anatomy and
physiology. Senses and their acuity vary not only from species to
species but also within the species.
As to knowledge by description, which arises in "inter-subjec-
tive" intercourse, it is a confusion as to the function of description
that is responsible for our delusion that we can make true proposi-
tions. If 1 man tells mc something and I understand the fact to be
or to have been, what it actually is or was. the function of descrip-
tion is adequately performed, in one sense. His proposition is true,
in one sense. And this is the original and, as it were, proper func-
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tion of "description." namely, the adequate conveyance of the
knowledge of a fact from one person to another. But it is perfectly
clear that the adequacy of the man's speech as an objective descrip-
tion of the fact conveved is quite another thing. As an objective
description of the fact his speech might be quite inadequate, untrue,
indeed must be Inadequate, must be untrue. For even though he
were a logician and a scientist, expert in the class of fact at issue,
he could not frame a proposition about it which, as logician, he could
claim to be true. Truth simply does not apply to the case of de-
scription of reality. To think so is like thinking our senses give
us knowledge of the real world.
Our knowledge is necessarily anthropomorphic. The terms in
which we describe the simplest brute fact are human terms. They
are interpretation. We are a juirror up to Nature and our knowl-
edge the reflection therein—a figure not to be pressed to the ques-
tion—reflection for whom? The world known by acquaintance and
by description, is a '"mental construction" and to know it better is
to have more and acuter senses and more adequate concepts. How
adequate? Harmonizing with our ethical and aesthetic ideals? With
the rest of our concepts ? With the facts of sense-experience? Har-
monizing with the facts. Take care of the pence, says the proverb.
If we take care of the facts, the ethical and aesthetic ideals will take
care of themselves.
My own reading of the facts of life dispenses with the mind.
(This does not imply that it dispenses with the spirit; it is able to
give an account of spiritual values.) Mind is explained away—in
theory always. What there is is life—a particular kind of physico-
chemical activity—manifesting itself in its own particular ways. So
much for my own concept of the animate world, \\niat of the
inanimate ?
In explaining away ^lind one explains away Matter, the object
of sense, as well as Knowledge, the activity, or the product of activ-
ity, of the understanding. But only Matter as the plain man under-
stands it, and this had already been done long ago both by philoso-
phers and by scientists. It is generally agreed by philosophers that
the existence of the external world is a matter of faith, not of knowl-
edge ; and scientists willingly admit that not only do they study
phenomena merely, but that their verification of their theories con-
sists in putting them to the test of sense-experience.
When language first began to be spoken the words used must
have represented sense-objects or events or situations apprehended
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through the senses. Yet even then much interpretation must have
been impHcit in speech, much have been taken for granted, the speak-
ers themselves for instance, as conscious persons, the reality of their
objects, Space and Time, concepts that were not made explicit any-
where on earth perhaps for millions of years.
But very early also there must have been explicit interpretation.
Men feeling the wind blow postulated a blower, hearing the thun-
der, a thunderer. This is the beginning of science, for the essence
of science is hypothesis, the interpretation of fact. "Explicit inter-
pretation" does not imply that the interpretation was recognized as
such. On the contrary experience shows that interpretative con-
cepts are very apt to be regarded as having the same standing as
concepts representative of sense-objects or events, i. e., as repre-
sentative of "reality," in the sense of phenomenal reality. This is
an illusion which is still common today. So much so, that one of
these interpretative concepts, "Mind," is regarded by perhaps the
majority of philosophers as the only reality.
The fact is that interpretative concepts are analogous not to
objects of sense but to the senses by which we are aware of objects
;
they are modes of insight, the senses of the understanding. The
concept "atom," for instance, gives us what we suppose a better
insight than we had before into the nature of chemical interactions.
The interpretative concept is a way of looking at nature, not the
representative of an actual existent in nature.
It does not follow, of course, that interpretative concepts neces-
sarily have no potentially sensible counterparts. We may keep an
open mind as to whether potentially sensible atoms do in fact exist.
The planet Neptune was a scientific object which turned out to cor-
respond to an "existent." It became a sense-object. And then in-
terpretation was out of place. We do not interpret objects of sense;
we perceive them and give names to them if we are sufficiently in-
terested.
The world is sensibly appreciated by difYerent species of animals
according to their kind. And we are not justified in presuming
that 7ife appreciate it more truly than our fellow-animals. Similarly,
the world is conceptually appreciated by different men in different
ways. Now in a sense no man is justified in presuming that he con
ceives it more truly than another. The animistic interpretation of
nature is one mode of conceiving it ; another mode regards nature
as a field of events. This latter mode is the scientific and its ideal
is to find uniformity in the way events happen and so to state the
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"necessary' conditions of their happening. It attempts to describe
the events with as little interpretation as possible, while at the same
time it is forced ultimately to interpretation by its passion to explain
how events are connected ; for the connections are not revealed to
sense.
The primitive animistic and the modern scientific interpretations
of nature are both anthropomorphic. And the latter can hardly be
considered truer than the former since the concept of force is not
more intelligible than that of God. And if the scientist says that
what he calls the concept force is simply "the way things happen,"
it is open to the primitive man. and the modern theologian, to retort
that that is what he calls God. Both parties can make their defini-
tion less and less anthropomorphic, less transcendent and more im-
manent, less capricious and more necessary, can in short sophisti-
cate it ad I'b.
As philosopher, then, T cannot assert anything whatever of the
universe. My scepticism is complete, since my incapacity to know
arises from the fact that T do not exist, as a knowing subject. T do
not know what "I know" means. Philosophically. T am simplv a
manifestation of life.
P)Ut as a plain man, with the plain man's prejudices diluted with
a little of the pure reason. I venture to believe that there are real
changes, and that they arise in a real external world, not simply in
my body, or in my imagination. This external world appears to
me in phenomena. Tn these phenomena I may find orderliness with-
out limit, but the order I find in them afifords no guarantee whatever
of the orderliness of the real world. The order of that world may
be as non-existent as purpose in life. This would not imply dis-
order. It is merely our weakness that supposes the world must be
either orderly or disorderly. These concepts may be transcended
by the physicist just as those of moral goodness and badness are
transcended in my theory of life. Order in phenomena implies
necessity. But it may be that the necessity of phenomenal events
is made up of contingencies, like the necessities of statistics. And
a contingency itself may be regarded as a necessity, is at any rate
made up out of necessities. The mysteries of physics indeed remind
one of those of theology, how for instance to reconcile God's fore-
knowledge and man's freedom. And perhaps they are as impossible
to solve, inasmuch as like the latter they are concerned with what
are mere inventions. "Necessity" and "contingency" are as con-
ceptual as "God" and "free will."
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From the beginning of philosophy the notion of the order of
the universe has been associated with those of Time and Space.
It has been analyzed mto them. Lately these two have been syn-
thetized into the concept of a world of four dimensions. In this
world, it seems, events do not happen either necessarily or contin-
gently, thev simply arc.
This appears to be the crowning mercy for Science, considered
as the study, the interpretation, of the order of the phenomenal
world. But it is only the order of nature that is thus conceived.
"And yet." says Professor Eddington. "in regard to the nature of
things, this knowledge is only an empty shell—a form of symbols.
It is knowledge of structural form, and not knowledge of content
. . . the mind has but regained from nature that which the minri
has put into nature." ^ The physicist, like the philosopher, admits
his ignorance of the events that underlie phenomena.
The epistemology. then, of my theory of life is simple. Practi-
cal truth is what works : oi theoretical truth there is none.
Space, Time and Crni'itotion
.
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